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East Timor: some current concerns and trends

In this paper, I want to touch on a number of current concerns and trends under the general heading of social and economic rights in East Timor. In so doing, I acknowledge my debt to several devoted colleagues in Indonesia whose research I have liberally plundered

The nature and extent of human rights abuses in East Timor have always been, and continue to be, controversial issues about which widely differing assessments are made. During the recent session of the UN Commission on Human Rights, for example, the Australian government presented a positive, even optimistic view of the situation, congratulating Indonesia on the progress made and looking forward to the correction of outstanding 'residual' problems. In marked contrast,. the twelve EC members, Australia's partners in WEOG, told the Commission of their 'grave concern' and 'preoccupation ' with continuing abuses, which they listed, and further distanced themselves from the Australian position by calling for a 'just settlement' in accordance with UN principles and 'the legitimate interests of the East Timorese people'.

To my mind, the EC assessment is a more accurate reading of the situation on the ground, and particularly the nature of the conflict and the solution that is required. Not only do serious human rights abuses continue in East Timor, but as the EC appreciates, they are the outcome of East Timor's forced integration into Indonesia and the East Timorese people's resistance to that integration in its many forms. The continuing violations cannot be attributed to breakdowns in military discipline or depicted as random acts unrelated to the fundamental conflict and therefore correctable through administrative measures. To seriously address the issue of human rights in East Timor means addressing the conflict itself and seeking to do something constructive about a sustainable political settlement. Anything less is both to misunderstand the nature of the struggle in East Timor and to avoid facing up to the need for a just and lasting settlement.

A survey of the human rights situation in East Timor over the last 12 months supports this contention. The familiar pattern of abuses has continued. According to our research,they have included incommunicado detention, detention without trial, severe beatings and torture, rape, disappearances, and extra-judicial executions. What is striking about these violations is that the majority has been inflicted on Timorese involved in resistance activities and are an integral part of Indonesia's campaign to contain, indeed neutralise, East Timorese nationalist aspirations.. The other notable feature is that the majority of those detained and often brutally beaten, are young people, mostly students, and some are public servants. They are the children of integration, the generation who for the most part have known only Indonesia and whose loyalty Indonesia should be able to call on. But, in the name of anti-colonialism they are rejecting their forced adoption. What is also striking about them is the strength of their rejection. Whether demonstrating, running up nationalist flags or communicating their views to the outside world or indeed the Indonesian authorities who, it should not be forgotten have virtually absolute powers in the situation, they manifest a spirit of open defiance resonant of the intifada.

An example will help explain what this phenomenon.. Domingos Pereira, who lives in Dili but does not want to withhold his name, photograph or address, even though he knows ther risks entailed, has written in Indonesian and signed what amounts to an affidavit regarding his political activity and period in detention.

Let me read parts of it to you. "I was detained on 3 November 1990 at 11.20 at night at my aunt's home. They broke down the door of the house, came in and hit me without mercy using iron bars, knives, and cane rods. They then took me to the Senopati I intelligence office. After arriving there I was subjected to the heaviest punishment. They struck me repeatedly smashing my face and nose till they bled. I was then transferred to a police station and was beaten unconscious in the car on the way... The next night I was transferred from the police cell to the Senopati II commando office for interrogation.

Q. Why have you been detained?
A. I don't know what I have done wrong.

Q. What do you mean you don't know your offence. You were surely detained because you have been demonstrating.
A. Yes, I have been demonstrating.

Q. How often have you taken part in demonstrations?
A. Five times.

Q. Whereabouts?
A. Taci Tolu on 12 October 1989 when the Pope visited; Hotel Tourismo on 17, 18, 19 January 1990; Lecidere on 4 September 1990.

Q. What has been the purpose of these demonstrations?
A. The purpose is to be free and not under the shadow of Indonesia or the Red and White flag.

Q. If you are free what will your country be called and what will be your flag?
A. I demand my right to freedom. My country is called Timor Leste, my flag is red, yellow, black and has a star in the middle.

Q. How do you know the colours of this flag?
A. I have known them since I was eight years old in the jungle.

Q. What do the colours mean?
A. Red means the blood of our fathers and brothers which was shed in 1975 and flowed from Oecusse to Jaco island. Yellow symbolises the freeing of East Timor from Portuguese and Japanese colonialism. Black signifies that although we have shed blood darkness prevails because many states have not recognised us; the star is the symbol of hope and God shining in the darkness.".

Domingos concluded the statement by saying he remained in detention until 12 November, another eight days. In our assessment there are many Domingos Pereiras in East Timor. They are clear headed and deeply committed to their cause. They also know they are widely supported by their compatriots and as such represent significant potential for long term conflict. They have to be listened to and responded to if the nature of the conflict in East Timor is to properly understood and addressed. Regrettably, however, few are listening. In January, for example, another activist Licinio took part in a demonstration appealing to US Ambassador John Monjo who was visiting Dili. It was brutally broken up by the authorities. When Licinio returned to school he was questioned by his teacher an Indonesian nun, about his absence. 'When I said I was at the demonstration she said: 'We feed you and give you everything, but you're still anti-Indonesian. You're a pack of layabouts, who think you're big shots'. I argued back, said Licinio and she continued to reprimand me: 'You know very well that East Timor

is a province of Indonesia'. I replied that this was untrue, because the United Nations does not recognise it as such. They told me that if I changed my views I could stay in school, but I refused so I was expelled. Indonesia's Defence Minister, Benny Murdani, made a special trip to Dili not long after to deliver the same style of lecture.....

Against this backdrop it comes as no surprise to learn that hundreds of unemployed young East Timorese will be brought to Java and other sites for years of vocational training in various Indonesian industrial enterprises. This initiative is being undertaken by Yayasan Tiara Indonesia, a foundation led by President Suharto's daughter, Siti Rukmana. It is feared that candidates are being selected from blacklists of young Dili protesters and is in reality an ingenious disposal route dressed up as philanthropy.

There are Indonesians in key positions who are trying new ways of relating to the East Timorese, different management techniques. The current Indonesian military commander in East Timor, Colonel Warouw. Warouw is one. He is more accessible and responsive, has appointed a Catholic as intelligence head, punished military who have abused human rights, released detainees relatively quickly and, as a result earned himself a positive reputation in some quarters. However he also represents the impossible dilemma Indonesians exercising power in East Timor face and the confused policy that results. Warouw may smile but in the last analysis he is a military man who ultimately resorts to military measures which compound the problem he is trying to resolve. Thus during his term, a new military offensive codenamed interestingly Operasi Senyum (Operation Smile) has been launched, and his military have sought to disguise repression by acting at night in mufti and recruiting East Timorese to do the dirty work. And even if one allows Warouw has represented a welcome change in approach, the question is what will happen after he moves on. Will the situation regress? Does he represent a radical review of thinking at the top and far reaching policy changes?

To illustrate the importance of this issue let me refer to an important change identified with Warouw that hopefully will be carried on regardless of who follows him as commander, namely accountability.

On 29 March last year, Candido Amaral was savagely tortured then shot by Indonesian commandos in the Viqueque area. Col Warouw acknowledged the crime by compensating Amaral's widow and punishing the soldier responsible for his death with dismissal. Warouw also confirmed that three other East Timorese were tortured at the same time. Such official admissions are to be welcomed as is the official acknowledgement that wrong has been done and merits punishment, though it is not known whether the torturers of Amaral's compatriots were punished. There have been few, if any, such admissions of wrongdoing in the past even though it is abundantly clear that there will be no substantial improvement in the human rights situation in East Timor until the perpetrators of abuses are subjected to due process and punished appropriately. This is not to pass judgement on the appropriateness of the punishment given Amaral's executioner, which would seem to be very light, but to acknowledge the importance of the principle that the rule of law must operate in East Timor, and that the military must be held strictly accountable to its provisions if human rights abuses are to be stopped.

My last observation before moving on relates to the role of NGOs in protecting and promoting human rights in East Timor. The easing of restrictions on access to East Timor has made monitoring of the human rights somewhat easier. Nevertheless East Timor remains a closed and fearful society in which the act of reporting or recording an abuse is potentially a hostile gesture and takes considerable commitment. Nevertheless the fact remains that comprehensive, accurate and up to date information is necessary if the international community is to fulfill its human rights obligations to the people of East Timor. I would propose that the international church might play a constructive role here mindful of the visit of the Pope to East Timor in 1989 and his public expression of concern about human rights problems in East Timor and the responsibility of the church. A collaborative arrangement with the local church in East Timor, which is close to the people, in the form of, for example, an appropriate institution would contribute significantly in this vital area.

Concern for the East Timorese and their basic rights must, however, extend beyond civil and political rights to their economic situation. Preoccupation with human rights and the political and military aspects of integration have diverted attention from economic developments in East Timor which have far reaching implications for the East Timorese and their future. These developments are building up momentum and, in time, will diversify Indonesia's relationship with East Timor beyond military monopolies. In so far as they have considerable potential to consolidate integration and work against self-determination, including economic self-determination, they deserve more scrutiny. Economic activity and exploitation in East Timor will increasingly become the main game.

I was reminded of this recently when an Indonesian trade delegation visited Australia to encourage Australian business investment in Indonesia. The delegation included East Timorese (equipped with glossy booklets full of colour pictures and lots of statistics on East Timor's economy) and was facilitated in its tour by the Australian Government through Austrade. I do not know whether they made any business converts. The point is that economic activity is underway and it is receiving official encouragement from both the Indonesian Government, in the form of its 'develop Eastern Indonesia' policy which is a centrepiece of the current Repelita, and the Australian Government which is applying considerable pressure on Australian business to invest in Indonesia as part of a broader economic and political strategy. I have only snippets of information regarding other foreign investment interest in East Timor but if it is happening in respect of the relatively small and sluggish Australian economy, there can be little doubt that Japan and the Asian tigers would be much further along this particular economic path, and the internationally disputed status of East Timor will be the least of their worries.

The most striking example of international economic activity in respect of East Timor is the joint venture by Australia and Indonesia to exploit the seabed resources in the Timor Sea. A Treaty to allow this exploitation in what is called the Timor Gap Zone of Cooperation has been ratified by both the Indonesian and Australian Parliaments and came into effect in February. Exploration permits in the jointly administered Zone A are expected to be granted by December this year and drilling in Zone A could begin as early as 1992. Japanese, European, US and other companies, including Petroz, BHP, Western Mining, BP, Shell and Chevron, are known to have strong interests in

the richly prospective zone. Portugal lodged a complaint against Australia with the International Court of Justice on 22 February last.Portugal argues that by signing the Treaty Australia has infringed on the right to self-determination of the people of East Timor. Australia, which unlike Indonesia accepts the jurisdiction of the Court, argues that there is no binding obligation not to recognise territory acquired by force, and is confident the legality of the Treaty will be upheld. Whatever the case for and against the legality of the Treaty, and this will be adjudicated as it should be in the appropriate forum, the arrangement is arguably inconsistent with the spirit of UN principles and would appear to have locked Australia in to the Indonesian camp and regrettably disqualified it from playing a constructive peace making role on the issue which, in the view of ACFOA, should be its first and overriding responsibility at this time.

At the same time Australia, perhaps in an effort to balance pragmatism with principle,is pushing ahead with fast track proposals to set up official aid projects in East Timor which will make it the first country to give direct government to government aid for the territory. In October 1989 it gave the provincial government AUD$100,000 for a small agricultural activities scheme, which is believed to have had mixed and in some aspects disappointing results. More recently Australia has also given $250,000 to a Church related development project.

Currently two major projects are underway. A team of Australian consultants spent 18 days in East Timor in January and February preparing a submission to Canberra on water supply and agricultural improvment projects. Feasibility studies on these projects have now been completed.

The project involves an agricultural activities scheme aimed at improving farmers' living conditions and productivity, based on programs which the Government says have been successfully applied in Eastern Indonesia, including West Timor. Under consideration are schemes to provide agricultural start-up facilities, improving livestock numbers and veterinary care, and expanding access to markets. It would involve basing an agricultural adviser in Dili and would aim at achieving maximum possible community participation. Over three years, the program would cost AUD$1 million. If expanded to include a regional planner working with the provincial planning agency, it would cost around $3 million.

The placement of Australian advisers would involve overcoming the Indonesian army's past opposition to any 'foreigners' living there, though small exceptions have been made for the ICRC and some Church personnel. The project would also need to overcome the local population's suspicion and scepticism about government projects.

The existence of these attitudes has been well documented in the Gadjah Mada report A Socio-Anthropological Study of East Timor published in March 1990. The study found a lack of local participation in development programs, local resentment at development being imposed on them, a widespread feeling that they are 'treated as a project' and cynicism as they see development funds disappearing into the pockets of officials.

The veterinary care aspect of the project would also aim - although this is unstated, to rectify some of the ravages inflicted on East

6. Timor's livestock herds during the Indonesian invasion and war between 1975 and 1980. Official Indonesian figures show that buffalo numbers, for instance, fell from 90,600 in 1976 to 16,500 in 1980. Goat herds were decimated from 188,000 to 26,000, and the number of horses fell from 85,400 to 16,500. The official explanation is that 'cattle production was seriously damaged during the turmoil years and afterwards because of neglect'. This is only partly true. Much of the decline is due to wanton slaughter of farm animals by the army and wholesale theft of cattle which were herded onto ships and taken to Java.

The second major project being examined by the Australian Government agency AIDAB involves improving water supply and sanitation in Dili and the town of Suai ,in the southwest, following requests by the National Planning Agency (Bappenas). In Dili the project would involve rehabilitating parts of the existing Portuguese water supply network, and extending it to outlying parts of the city occupied by recent East Timorese arrivals from rural areas, who live in squatter type slum conditions. Even if there is a genuine commitment to ensuring that the improvements benefit Timorese, the project would inevitably make Dili more attractive to Indonesian settlers, who continue to flood into the city, which has recorded an annual population growth of 7% over each of the past two years. Given that the project will have to work through the Indonesian bureaucracy, it would appear impossible to design programs that can discriminate between the Timorese and non-Timorese population. Much of the infrastructure improvements undertaken by Indonesia in what it boasts is a massive development effort have benefitted those parts of Dili housing government officials, military and police.

The need for improved access to water is not denied. Only 3000 households in a city of 110,000 are connected to the water system. Yet these figures undermine Indonesia's repeated claims that it has poured development funds into the territory for the betterment of the local people.

The second water supply and sanitation project, again based on a request by Bappenas, is in the area of the rural township of Suai. It is understood the Indonesian Government had already earmarked funds for this project before it suggested it as a suitable recipient of Australian aid. Balinese farmers have moved into the district under the transmigration program, originally to set up show-piece model farms, although this official influx appears to have halted.

Overall, the East Timor water supply project would involve an Australian contribution of between $6 to $10 million over five years.

It is not known if the consultants involved in the preliminary visits to East Timor expressed their privately stated reservations about the long term economic, social and political implications of the program in their report to Canberra. The amount of money involved will inevitably attract more government officials and more settlers to the region. The program will further cement Australia's official recognition of East Timor as an Indonesian province. It will add respectability to Jakarta's claims that it has done more for East Timor in 15 years or so than Portugal ever did. The exercise will also place consultants living in East Timor on the horns of a dilemma in the face of continuing military operations and excesses.

I have supplied some detail on this project because it represents a new development which is not widely known about but also because it raises important questions for development NGOs, whether Indonesian or international, who can now access East Timor and deliver much needed development assistance but who do not wish to provide comfort to Jakarta. Some NGOs will oppose involvement on principle adopting a policy similar to that of NGOs in relation to Burma. My sense of it is, however, that there is a growing consensus that, on balance, NGOs should be involved because serious needs exist and a useful role with and on behalf of the East Timorese can be played at this point as at least a partial alternative to government projects.. Some of the issues which need to be weighed up include consideration of whether NGOs can in principle participate in a program premised on de iure recognition of integration such as that of the Australian Government described above; the degree to which NGO projects can target the poor and maximise their participation; the degree to which NGOs can empower East Timorese, and promote institution strengthening and self-reliance; and the degree to which NGOs can provide protection and promote and protect human rights and contribute to the building of democracy.

The Gadjah Mada study was in part undertaken in response to the disappointing lack of Indonesian business investment in East Timor in contrast to massive government spending. Two years after President Suharto declared East Timor an 'open province', following lobbying by Governor Mario Carrascalao who saw this as the only way to attract economic investment, business in the territory remains dominated by the army and companies with close links to senior military and political figures. As the Gadjah Mada study found, the local people feel East Timor is "used as a milking cow by powerful economic groups from Java".

The most prominent of these is the Batara Indra group, headed by Robby Sumampouw, a publicity shy Javanese businessman with close and long standing links to Defence Minister Benny Murdani. These links go back to the 1960s when one of Sumampouw's companies was contracted to supply vehicles to Murdani when he was an army divisional commander. Another of his companies makes military footwear.

He has been active in East Timor since 1976, and his group is one of the largest companies operating there. The army backed company PT Denok, which has a virtual monopoly on East Timor's coffee crop, is linked to Sumampouw's company PT Batara Indra, which has interests in trading, coffee bean exports and manufacturing sandal wood oil. He also has close links with other Indonesian conglomerates, including the Wanandi group which also has interests in East Timor.

The 'opening' of East Timor appears to have done little to lift the stranglehold which the army and army linked companies have on the lucrative coffee crop and trade into and out of East Timor. Sumampouw has the franchise on direct shipping between Dili and Singapore, under which duty free goods come in, in what in the past has amounted to official smuggling. American cigarettes, Portuguese wines and spirits are on sale in Dili, all marked 'Singapore duty not paid'. Last year Sumampouw bought the Turismo Hotel and recently opened the more expensive Mahkota Hotel.

The Wanandi group, which is involved in some joint ventures with Sumampouw, also has long standing economic and political interests in East Timor. As head of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta, Yusuf Wanandi played a key role in the campaign to destabilise East Timor in 1974-5 and in gaining international acceptance of Indonesia's actions. He also has substantial business interests. His net personal assets are estimated at US$76 million. His brother Marcus, a Jesuit priest, has a key position in the East Timorese church.

According to government sources in East Timor, Sofyan Wanandi, another brother, plans a large tourist development in Baucau. The project, involving Japanese partners, envisages a 400 bed resort type development on the Baucau beach. The development depends on Baucau airport being opened to international traffic. Built by the Portuguese and capable of taking wide bodied aircraft, it is currently used by the military. The central government has promised to do this later this year, allowing flights to land there from Japan and Australia. It is thought the development will be a resort enclave with trained staff and supplies brought in from outside East Timor. The central government has yet to respond to repeated calls by Governor Carrascalao to allow international air traffic to use Dili airport. Local officials report that Sofyan Wanandi also plans a golf course near Maubisse.

A newly opened marble mining and processing operation also has links to the army and the Suharto family. The operation, on the road to Baucau east of Dili, is controlled by Harry Murdani, the brother of Benny Murdani, according to officials in Dili. President Suharto's daughter, Tutut, is also said to have an interest in the operation.

East Timorese involvement in the economy is negligible. There are believed to be only two or three East Timorese who can be described as entrepreneurs. They depend on the few government contracts which the Governor is able to award. The bulk of such contracts is awarded and controlled by Jakarta. The Governor remains a large landholder and coffee plantation owner.

In the Portuguese colonial era, business in East Timor was dominated by ethnic Chinese interests. Many of these have since left, to Australia and Macau. But it is not only big business which is dominated by Indonesians. Visitors to Dili and the main towns cannot avoid noticing that shops, small stalls, markets and restaurants are almost all run by Indonesians from Sulawesi and Java. The influx of Indonesians, at home with the language and system, is described by East Timorese as the 'second invasion' and they now make up an estimated 150,000 of the total population of 750,000. East Timorese have no commercial tradition. Unable to compete they face economic marginalisation. Officially a policy of 'normalisation' is being applied to East Timor. The Timorese are learning that economic exploitation is a central part of that normalisation.

Local government officials hope that tourism will play a major role in the economic development of East Timor. There are plans to build some 30 losmen throughout the territory and to renovate Portuguese villas in Maubisse, Tutuala, Same and Baucau as tourist attractions and accommodation. A Tourism Department was established in a new building in Dili last year, headed by an East Timorese who was the former bupati of Maubisse. A friend recently visited Maubisse along with 40

ex-patriates from Jakarta who had sailed to Dili on the luxury cruiser the Spice Islander. One of the advertised features was to observe a traditional harvest festival in Maubisse. To accommodate the tourists, the festival had been held up for a month, then was postponed for a day when the Spice Islander was late. The Timorese participants, who were not paid for their services, were arranged in what my friend described as military lines, their horses draped with Indonesian flags. Only one singer really sang, the others simply went through the motions, barely moving their lips. Police stood about and non-participating Timorese were kept back to allow the tourists good picture opportunities. The event was 'quite awful' said my friend who concluded that the festival, once an integral and joyful part of local life, had been co-opted for tourism.

In the main, however, private investors are dubious about the prospects and reluctant to invest until infrastructure improves and the tourist numbers pick up. In the first year after the 'opening', only 1190 tourists visited and last year only 1317. The bulk of these tourists came from Australia and visited, it is said, out of political interest. Lack of transport, poor communications and facilities, an unsavoury history and a heavy military presence will ensure that for the time being East Timor will continue to be bypassed by tourism.

The influx of land hungry newcomers and efforts to increase Indonesian business activity in East Timor raises the question of land ownership in East Timor. Land ownership in East Timor will be converted from the Portuguese to the Indonesian system in the course of this year. The issue has the potential to generate considerable heartburn among the 850 middle class Portuguese title holders and already some East Timorese are referring to the new land regulations as another invasion. The two systems are quite distinct with the Indonesian system, at least in theory, ironically resembling the sort of land reforms Fretilin might have introduced. Indonesian land laws prohibit foreigners owning land. The new regulations, therefore, will effectively relieve non-Indonesian East Timorese (i.e. East Timorese living abroad and East Timorese in East Timor who have refused Indonesian citizenship) of their land without compensation. East Timorese who are Indonesian citizens ought to experience few problems if the regulations are properly implemented. However in practice many have experienced serious downgrading of their title to the lowest classification while many new arrivals seem to have no trouble acquiring the highest grade on land only recently obtained.

How will the new regulations affect the majority of the people, the tens of thousands of rural traditional land owners who have no certificate? As elsewhere, Indonesia urges traditional land owners to obtain legal security by registering the land and offers them hak milik, the most secure form of owning land. The condition is that the land should be actually owner-occupied and ownership must be accredited by a 'witnessing institution' appointed by the local bupati. In practice, therefore, the traditional owner is in a weak position. A great deal will depend on the bupati's knowledge of local customs and integrity in the face of possible corruption or intimidation from above. Further 'actual occupancy' would appear to be a entirely unfair criterion to apply in East Timor where vast tracts of land have been unoccupied for years because of the military practice of moving the population into resettlement centres. The potential for grave miscarriages of justice would seem to be great, particularly in the absence of an independent judicial system and legal aid services.

10. As the journal Inside Indonesia, on which I have drawn virtually verbatim for this section, recently observed: "Indonesian official rhetoric places the expulsion of the colonial Portuguese in the same light as the ouster they gave the Dutch after Indonesian Independence. But world opinion, ready to sympathise with some gung-ho nationalism in the 1950s, sees East Timor rather differently. If an offer of war reparations was too much to hope for, a generous gesture on the conversion of land title could have helped to heal war wounds inflicted by Indonesia. Instead the Indonesian bureaucracy has settled on an unimaginative and rigid application of laws designed for different circumstances".

I would like to conclude on a slightly more positive note by drawing your attention to one outcome of integration which has largely escaped notice, namely the coming out in Indonesia of young East Timorese intellectuals. Over 1000 students have been sent to universities scattered between Bali and Sumatra since the mid 1980s. Some have failed due to a combination of factors such as language difficulties, cultural maladjustment, poor academic grounding, and racism. Others have been politically passive, but a minority are beginning to reach out to appallingly ignorant Indonesian colleagues with the truth about East Timor.

One important group are those Xanana Gusmao has described as 'of great significance', the underground resistance network. They are strongly committed to independence for East Timor and are prepared to face considerable risks without the protection of the connections and press sympathy Indonesian student activists enjoy. Others prefer more legitimate, cautious forms of activism. Forming East Timorese Student Associations they hold seminars which often reach at least the local press. At one in Semarang early last year, Prof. Herman Johannes was invited to explain his opposition to the Timor Gap Treaty which he felt disadvantaged Indonesia. At another Satya Wacana economists explained the regional development plan they had designed for the East Timorese provincial government.

Some are beginning to take up contact with leading-edge thinkers in academic and NGO circles who are questioning the limits of nationalism and believe East Timor should be placed on the domestic agenda. Some, like Joao Mariano, an economics lecturer at a private university in Jakarta, are using their training and position to advantage. In a chapter on the East Timorese economy in a forthcoming book, Mariano takes a jab at the large expenditures in East Timor on infrastructure. "It's like a ball thrown at a wall: it just bounces off to Denpasar, to Surabaya and especially to Jakarta. Local production plays no role, so that the multiplier effect does not operate", he writes. He then goes on to make suggestions including the need for special measures to discriminate in favour of indigenous East Timorese, and the construction of an oil exploration base on East Timor's undeveloped south coast so that benefits can flow to the East Timorese.

There is more to the Indonesian-East Timor relationship than the military, as East Timorese participation on the increasingly dynamic civil-political stage demonstrates. Indeed it is not too much to say that there is emancipatory potential in this aspect of integration, particularly if democratic ideals growing among Indonesians find their meeting point with East Timorese aspirations and both receive the international support they deserve.

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